Damage to the prefrontal cortex increases utilitarian moral judgements by Koenigs, Michael et al.
Damage to the prefrontal cortex increases utilitarian moral
judgements
Michael Koenigs1,*,†, Liane Young2,*, Ralph Adolphs1,3, Daniel Tranel1, Fiery Cushman2,
Marc Hauser2, and Antonio Damasio1,4
1 Department of Neurology, University of Iowa Hospitals and Clinics, Iowa City, Iowa 52242, USA
2 Department of Psychology, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138, USA
3 Division of Humanities and Social Sciences and Division of Biology, California Institute of Technology,
Pasadena, California 91125, USA
4 Brain and Creativity Institute and Dornsife Center for Cognitive Neuroimaging, University of Southern
California, Los Angeles, California 90089, USA
Abstract
The psychological and neurobiological processes underlying moral judgement have been the focus
of many recent empirical studies1–11. Of central interest is whether emotions play a causal role in
moral judgement, and, in parallel, how emotion-related areas of the brain contribute to moral
judgement. Here we show that six patients with focal bilateral damage to the ventromedial prefrontal
cortex (VMPC), a brain region necessary for the normal generation of emotions and, in particular,
social emotions12–14, produce an abnormally ‘utilitarian’ pattern of judgements on moral dilemmas
that pit compelling considerations of aggregate welfare against highly emotionally aversive
behaviours (for example, having to sacrifice one person’s life to save a number of other lives)7,8. In
contrast, the VMPC patients’ judgements were normal in other classes of moral dilemmas. These
findings indicate that, for a selective set of moral dilemmas, the VMPC is critical for normal
judgements of right and wrong. The findings support a necessary role for emotion in the generation
of those judgements.
The basis of our moral judgements has been a long-standing focus of philosophical inquiry
and, more recently, active empirical investigation. In a departure from traditional rationalist
approaches to moral cognition that emphasize the role of conscious reasoning from explicit
principles15, modern accounts have proposed that emotional processes, conscious or
unconscious, may also play an important role16,17. Emotion-based accounts draw support
from multiple lines of empirical work: studies of clinical populations reveal an association
between impaired emotional processing and disturbances in moral behaviour1–4;
neuroimaging studies consistently show that tasks involving moral judgement activate brain
areas known to process emotions5–9; and behavioural studies demonstrate that manipulation
of affective state can alter moral judgements10,11. However, neuroimaging studies do not
settle whether putatively ‘emotional’ activations are a cause or consequence of moral
judgement; behavioural studies in healthy individuals do not address the neural basis of moral
judgement; and no clinical studies have specifically examined the moral judgements (as
opposed to moral reasoning or moral behaviour) of patients with focal brain lesions. In brief,
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none of the existing studies establishes that brain areas integral to emotional processes are
necessary for the generation of normal moral judgements. As a result, there remains a critical
gap in the evidence relating moral judgement, emotion and the brain.
Investigating moral judgements in individuals with focal damage to the ventromedial prefrontal
cortex (VMPC) provides a key test. The VMPC projects to basal forebrain and brainstem
regions that execute bodily components of emotional responses18, and neurons within the
VMPC encode the emotional value of sensory stimuli19. Patients with VMPC lesions exhibit
generally diminished emotional responsivity and markedly reduced social emotions (for
example, compassion, shame and guilt) that are closely associated with moral values1,2,12–
14,16, and also exhibit poorly regulated anger and frustration tolerance in certain
circumstances20,21. Despite these patent defects both in emotional response and emotion
regulation, the capacities for general intelligence, logical reasoning, and declarative knowledge
of social and moral norms are preserved20–23. We selected a sample of six patients with adult-
onset, focal bilateral VMPC lesions (Fig. 1) as well as both neurologically normal (NC) and
brain-damaged comparison (BDC) subjects. Importantly, each of the VMPC patients had
striking defects in social emotion but generally intact intellect and normal baseline mood
(Tables 1 and 2, see also Supplementary Table 1). In particular, all six VMPC patients had
impaired autonomic activity in response to emotionally charged pictures (Table 2), as well as
severely diminished empathy, embarrassment and guilt (Table 2). All comparison subjects (NC
and BDC) had intact emotional processing.
Subjects evaluated moral dilemmas designed to pit two competing considerations against one
another. A paradigmatic dilemma of this type presents subjects with the choice of whether or
not to sacrifice one person’s life to save the lives of others. One consideration is a utilitarian
calculation of how to maximize aggregate welfare, whereas the other is a strong emotional
aversion to the proposed action. One model holds that endorsement of the proposed action (the
utilitarian response) requires the subject to overcome an emotional response against inflicting
direct harm to another person (a ‘personal’ harm7,8). If emotional responses mediated by
VMPC are indeed a critical influence on moral judgement, individuals with VMPC lesions
should exhibit an abnormally high rate of utilitarian judgements on the emotionally salient, or
‘personal’, moral scenarios (for example, pushing one person off a bridge to stop a runaway
boxcar from hitting five people), but a normal pattern of judgements on the less emotional, or
‘impersonal’, moral scenarios (for example, turning a runaway boxcar away from five people
but towards one person). If, alternatively, emotion does not play a causal role in the generation
of moral judgements but instead follows from the judgements24,25, then individuals with
emotion defects due to VMPC lesions should show a normal pattern of judgements on all
scenarios.
To test for between-group differences in the probability of utilitarian responses given for each
scenario type (non-moral, impersonal moral, personal moral), we used a logistic regression
fitted with the generalized estimating equations method (Fig. 2). There were no significant
differences between groups on the non-moral or impersonal moral scenarios (all P values
>0.29, corrected for multiple comparisons). In contrast, for personal moral scenarios, the
VMPC group was more likely to endorse the proposed action than either the NC group (odds
ratio = 2.81; P = 0.04, corrected) or BDC group (odds ratio = 3.30; P = 0.006, corrected). There
was no difference between the NC and BDC groups (odds ratio = 0.85; P = 0.68, uncorrected).
These data indicate that the VMPC group’s responses differed only for personal moral
scenarios, suggesting that VMPC-mediated processes affect only those moral judgements
involving emotionally salient actions.
In a more fine-grained analysis, we examined response patterns within the personal moral
scenarios. For seven out of the 21 personal moral scenarios, both comparison groups were at
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100% agreement in their judgements. An additional eighth scenario elicited 100% agreement
from the BDC group, and near-perfect agreement from the NC group (with only one participant
deviating from the shared response). These eight scenarios were therefore classified as ‘low-
conflict’ (for example, abandoning one’s baby to avoid the burden of caring for it). The
remaining 13 scenarios (none of which elicited 100% agreement from either comparison group)
were classified as ‘high-conflict’ (for example, smothering one’s baby to save a number of
people). Reaction-time data support this distinction: response latencies in the NC group on
high-conflict scenarios were significantly longer than on low-conflict scenarios (t-test with 19
degrees of freedom, t(19) = −3.63; P = 0.002).
Like the patients in the comparison groups, the VMPC patients uniformly rejected the proposed
action in every one of the low-conflict scenarios (Fig. 3). In contrast, significant differences
emerged for the high-conflict scenarios: the VMPC group was more likely to endorse the
proposed action than either the NC (odds ratio = 4.70; P = 0.05, corrected) or BDC group (odds
ratio = 5.38; P = 0.02, corrected), with no difference between the NC and BDC participants
(odds ratio = 0.87; P = 0.77, uncorrected). Every high-conflict personal scenario elicited the
same pattern: a greater proportion of the VMPC group endorsed the action than either
comparison group.
To recapitulate, VMPC patients’ judgements differed from comparison subjects’ only for the
high-conflict personal moral dilemmas, all of which featured competing considerations of
aggregate welfare on the one hand, and, on the other hand, harm to others that would normally
evoke a strong social emotion. Low-conflict personal moral scenarios lacked this degree of
competition. This difference probably accounts for the greater consensus and faster reaction
times on low-conflict personal dilemmas in the comparison groups, and it can also account for
the VMPC patients’ pattern of judgements. Evidence suggests that knowledge of explicit social
and moral norms is intact in individuals with VMPC damage21,22. In the absence of an
emotional reaction to harm of others in personal moral dilemmas, VMPC patients may rely on
explicit norms endorsing the maximization of aggregate welfare and prohibiting the harming
of others. This strategy would lead VMPC patients to a normal pattern of judgements on low-
conflict personal dilemmas but an abnormal pattern of judgements on high-conflict personal
dilemmas, precisely as was observed. The specificity of this result argues against a general
deficit in the capacity for moral judgement following VMPC damage. Rather, VMPC seems
to be critical only for moral dilemmas in which social emotions play a pivotal role in resolving
moral conflict4,8,16,17.
It is important to note that the effects of VMPC damage on emotion processing depend on
context. In this study, the VMPC patients’ abnormally high rate of utilitarian judgements is
attributed to diminished social emotion, whereas in a recent study of the Ultimatum Game,
theVMPC patients’ abnormally high rate of rejection of unfair monetary offers was attributed
to poorly controlled frustration, manifested as exaggerated anger20. These seemingly
contradictory findings highlight two distinct aspects of emotion impairment that are due to
VMPC damage. In most circumstances, VMPC patients exhibit generally blunted affect and a
specific defect of social emotions, but in response to direct personal frustration or provocation,
VMPC patients may exhibit short-temper, irritability, and anger. In the moral judgement task
we report here, participants respond to hypothetical actions and outcomes that elicit social
emotions related to concern for others. In the Ultimatum Game, in contrast, participants respond
to unfair take-it-or-leave-it offers that trigger frustration. In brief, the tasks in the two studies
are different in that the Ultimatum Game involves self-interest in a real behavioural setting,
whereas the task in the present study focuses on the interest of others described in a hypothetical
scenario.
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To conclude, the present findings are consistent with a model in which a combination of
intuitive/affective and conscious/rational mechanisms operate to produce moral
judgements8,22,24–27. Though the precise characterization of these potential systems awaits
further work, the current results suggest that the VMPC is a critical neural substrate for the
intuitive/affective but not for the conscious/rational system.
METHODS
Subjects
Six patients with bilateral, adult-onset damage to the VMPC and twelve brain-damaged
comparison patients who had lesions that excluded structures thought to be important for
emotions (VMPC, amygdala, insula, right somatosensory cortices) were recruited from the
Patient Registry of the Division of Cognitive Neuroscience at the University of Iowa. Twelve
healthy comparison subjects with no brain damage were recruited from the Iowa community.
Groups were age-, gender- and ethnicity-matched. All participants gave written informed
consent.
Neuroanatomical analysis
The neuroanatomical analysis of VMPC patients (Fig. 1) was based on magnetic resonance
data for two subjects (those with lesions due to the surgical resection of orbital meningiomas)
and on computerized tomography data for the other four subjects (with lesions due to rupture
of an anterior communicating artery aneurysm). All neuroimaging data were obtained in the
chronic epoch. Each patient’s lesion was reconstructed in three dimensions using
Brainvox28. Using the MAP-3 technique, the lesion contour for each patient was manually
warped into a normal template brain. The overlap of lesions in this volume, calculated by the
sum of n lesions overlapping on any single voxel, is colour-coded in Fig. 1.
Stimuli and task
Participants made judgements on a series of 50 hypothetical scenarios, which were adapted
from a previously published set8. See the Supplementary Information for the full text of the
actual scenarios used. Each scenario was presented as text through a series of three screens.
The first two described the scenario and the third posed a question about a hypothetical action
related to the scenario (“Would you … in order to …?”). Participants read and responded at
their own pace, pressing an ‘up’ arrow key to advance from one screen to the next, and a ‘yes’
or ‘no’ button to indicate an answer to the question. ‘Yes’ responses always indicated
commission of the proposed action. There was no time limit for reading the scenario description
(screens 1 and 2). Participants had a maximum of 25 s to read the final question screen and
respond.
We used three classes of stimuli: non-moral scenarios (n = 18), and two classes of moral
scenarios subdivided according to the emotional reaction elicited by the proposed action:
‘personal’ (n = 21) or ‘impersonal’ (n = 11), as described previously7,8. To validate this
subdivision, an independent group of ten neurologically normal subjects rated the emotional
salience of the actions proposed in the moral scenarios. The actions described in personal
scenarios were rated as significantly more emotionally salient than the actions described in
impersonal scenarios (means were 5.9 and 3.0 on a scale from 1 to 7, respectively; t(31) =
−8.90, P<0.0001). Within either class of moral scenarios (personal or impersonal), it was not
valid to separately analyse judgements based on the emotional salience of the proposed action
(that is ‘high-emotion’ versus ‘low-emotion’ scenarios) because emotionality ratings were
remarkably similar for scenarios within each class: 9 of the 11 impersonal scenarios received
a mean emotion rating between 1.1 and 3.0, while 20 of the 21 personal scenarios received a
mean emotion rating between 5.3 and 6.7.
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We further subdivided the personal moral scenarios into ‘low-conflict’ and ‘high-conflict’ on
the basis of the reaction times and consensus produced on them by normal subjects. Reaction
times on high-conflict scenarios were significantly longer than on low-conflict scenarios (t
(19) = −3.63, P = 0.002). Importantly, low-conflict and high-conflict scenarios did not differ
in their rated emotional salience (t(19) = −0.85, P = 0.41).
Supplementary Material
Refer to Web version on PubMed Central for supplementary material.
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Figure 1. Lesion overlap of VMPC patients
Lesions of the six VMPC patients displayed in mesial views and coronal slices. The colour bar
indicates the number of overlapping lesions at each voxel.
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Figure 2. Moral judgements for each scenario type
Proportions of ‘yes’ judgements are shown for each subject group. Error bars indicate 95%
confidence intervals. We used three classes of stimuli: non-moral scenarios (n = 18),
impersonal moral scenarios (n = 11), and personal moral scenarios (n = 21). On personal moral
scenarios, the frequency of endorsing ‘yes’ responses was significantly greater in the VMPC
group than in either comparison group (P values < 0.05, corrected).
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Figure 3. Moral judgements on individual personal moral scenarios
Proportions of ‘yes’ judgements given by each subject group for each of the 21 personal moral
scenarios. Individual scenarios (numbered 1–21 on the x axis) are ordered by increasing
proportion of ‘yes’ responses given by the normal comparison group. Responses did not differ
between subject groups for the low-conflict scenarios (left of the vertical line). The VMPC
group made a greater proportion of ‘yes’ judgements than either comparison group for every
one of the high-conflict scenarios (right of the vertical line).
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Table 2
VMPC patient social emotion data
Subject SCRs Empathy Embarrassment Guilt
1 Impaired 3 3 3
2 Impaired 3 3 3
3 Impaired 3 3 3
4 Impaired 2 2 1
5 Impaired 3 3 3
6 Impaired 3 3 3
SCRs, skin conductance responses to emotionally charged socially significant stimuli (for example, pictures of social disasters, mutilations, nudes), using
methods previously described12. The same SCR experiment was performed in ten of twelve BDC patients, and all ten demonstrated normal SCRs to
emotionally charged pictures. A clinical neuropsychologist blind to the hypotheses of the current study rated each VMPC patient’s demonstrated capacity
for empathy, embarrassment and guilt in his or her personal life. The rating used a four-point scale denoting severity of impairment, where 0 = normal, 1
= mild, 2 = moderate and 3 = severe. Ratings were based on data derived from spouse or family member reports in the Iowa Rating Scales of Personality
Change29 and from data from clinical interviews. Both of these sources provide direct observations about the patient’s basic and social emotions, and
include questions about whether the patient experiences and manifests emotions such as sadness, anxiety, empathy, embarrassment and guilt.
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